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TOWARD A GREENER GATT: 
ENVIRONMENTAL TRADE MEASURES 
AND THE SHRIMP-TURTLE CASE 
HOWARD F. CHANG* 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate B ody issued the 
most important ruling to date on the status of environmental trade measures 
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)1 in its 1998 
report in the "shrimp-turtle" case.2 At issue in this case was section 609 of 
Public Law 10 1- 162,3 a U.S .  statute that the U.S .  Court of International 
Trade had interpreted as a ban on shrimp imports from countries not 
certified by the United S tates as having adopted "a regulatory program 
governing the incidental taking of .. . sea turtles ... that is comparable to 
that of the United S tates . "4 The United States adopted such a program to 
promote the conservation of sea turtles, which are endangered species. 
This program includes a requirement that U.S .  trawlers use turtle excluder 
devices (TEDs) to protect sea turtles from incidental capture and drowning 
in shrimping nets. India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand complained that 
the U . S .  ban on shrimp imports violated GATT Article XI,5 which prohibits 
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School; member of the University of 
Southern California Law School faculty, 1992-1999. © 2000 Howard F. Chang, all rights reserved. I 
wish to thank Richard Parker and Curtis Reitz for helpful comments on an earlier draft and participants 
at the Round-Table Conference on Conservation and Management of Marine Living Resources and 
International Trade Policy, sponsored by the Institute of Cetacean Research in Tokyo, Japan, for 
comments on a paper that provided the basis for this essay. 
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-ll, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
2. Report of the Appellate Body on U.S. Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, Oct. 12, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 118 (1999) [hereinafter Appellate Body]. 
3. Sea Turtle Conservation Amendments to the Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. 101-162, sec. 
609, 103 Stat. 988, 1037 (Nov. 21, 1989) (amending 16 U.S.C. § 1537 (1994)). 
4. !d. sec. 609(b)(2)(A). See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 20 Ct. Int'l Trade 1221 (1996), 
vacated sub nom. Earth Island Inst. v. Albright, 147 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
5. GATT art. Xl. 
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quantitative restrictions on imports, and requested that a WTO panel settle 
their dispute with the United States. 
Given the hostile attitude toward environmental trade measures 
reflected in past panel decisions under the GATT, the WTO Appellate 
Body's ruling in the shrimp-turtle case represents a significant step toward 
more liberal treatment of these measures under the GATT. In stark contrast 
to the consistent pattern in those past decisions, the Appellate Body upheld 
the statute in dispute and objected only to very specific aspects of its 
implementation. The ruling suggests that countries can defend unilateral 
import bans as permissible environmental measures under the GATT as 
long as they avoid unfair discrimination. The result was a decision much 
more sensitive to environmental interests than expected. In this essay, I 
will draw upon my past writings, which have criticized GATT panels for 
their hostile treatment of environmental trade measures,6 to argue that the 
WTO Appellate Body's decision brings GATT case law much closer to a 
reasonable balance between environmental and trade interests. 
The shrimp-turtle decision endorses the general type of case-by-case 
review proposed in my prior work.7 The Appellate Body' s ruling in this 
case, however, has generated some confusion regarding the standard that 
WTO panels should apply to environmental trade measures in the future. 
This confusion, in turn, has generated some controversy regarding what the 
United States must do in order to bring its turtle conservation policies into 
compliance with the GATT. 8 In this essay, I will argue in favor of an 
interpretation of the shrimp-turtle decision that preserves broad leeway for 
the use of environmental trade measures. I will argue that a more 
restrictive interpretation of the ruling would be inconsistent with the 
Appellate Body's close attention to the text of the GATT. 
I. TOWARD MORE LIBERAL TREATMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
TRADE MEASURES 
The United States defended its ban on shrimp imports as a measure 
falling within GATT Article XX, which sets forth general exceptions from 
6. Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect rhe Global 
Environment, 83 GEO. L.J. 2131 (1995) [hereinafter Chang, Trade Measures]; Howard F. Chang, 
Carrots, Sticks, and Intemarional Externalities, 17 lNT'L REV. L. & ECON. 309 (1997) [hereinafter 
Chang, International Externalities]. 
7. See sources cited supra note 6. 
8. See Asians Conies£ U.S. Shrimp!Jurtle Rule, Call for Complele Lifting of Imparl Ban, 16 
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1250 (July 28, 1999); Daniel Pruzin, Malaysia, U.S. Reach Modus Vivendi on 
WTO Shrimp-Turlle Row; India Next, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 82 (Jan. 20, 2000). 
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the obligations set forth elsewhere in the GATT. In particular, Article XX 
states, in pertinent part: 
' 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
contracting party of measures: 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption; 
9 
In May 1998, the WTO panel nevertheless ruled against the United 
States.10 
When the United States lost before the WTO panel in the shrimp-turtle 
case, it was the third time in a row that a dispute-settlement panel had held 
that the United States had violated the GATT by banning imports harvested 
in a manner harmful to marine life. Pursuant to the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act (MMP A), 11 the United States has banned imports of tuna 
from countries that have not adopted programs to protect dolphins 
comparable to the U.S. program. In 1991 and again in 1994, dispute­
settlement panels held that the MMP A violated the GATT. 12 Both those 
GATT panels, like the WTO panel in the shrimp-turtle case, ruled against 
the United States on grounds so general and sweeping that they left little 
scope for trade measures to protect the global environment. The GATT 
Council, however, adopted neither of the "tuna-dolphin" panel reports, 
which therefore never became legally binding. 
In the shrimp-turtle case, the United States appealed the panel's ruling 
to the WTO Appellate Body, which in October 1998 also ruled against the 
9. GATT art. XX. 
10. See WTO Panel Report on U.S. Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
May 15, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 832 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 Panel]. 
11. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421h (1994). 
12. See GATT Panel Report on U.S. Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, May 20, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 
839 (1994) (hereinafter 1994 Panel]; GATT Panel Report on U.S. Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 
Aug. 16, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993) [hereinafter 1991 Panel]. 
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United States, but on much narrower grounds than the panel below. In its 
ruling, the Appellate Body used much better legal reasoning than that seen 
in past panel decisions, with much closer attention to the plain meaning of 
the language in GATT Article XX. For example, in the shrimp-turtle case 
the panel below required that the type of measure allowed under Article 
XX "not undermine the WTO multilateral trading system,"13 a requirement 
that echoed a concern expressed by both the 1991 and 1994 tuna-dolphin 
panels. 14 The Appellate Body explicitly rejected this requirement as "a test 
that finds no basis ... in the text" of Article XX.15 This attention to the 
treaty text is itself significant, because each of the prior panel decisions 
ruled against the United States based on requirements that the panels 
invented without any support in the text of Article XX. 16 Critics of those 
past decisions, including this author, have urged a more literal reading of 
Article XX, which implies a broader reading of the Article XX 
exceptions.17 
A. PROCESSES AND RESOURCES OUTSIDE THE JURISDICTION OF THE 
IMPORTING COUNTRY 
The Appellate Body agreed that section 609 was a measure "'relating 
to' the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource."18 Therefore, the 
Appellate Body concluded that the statute came within the exception in 
Article XX(g) despite the fact that section 609 called for a unilateral ban on 
imports based on the process by which they were made or harvested 
outside the United States. These types of attempts to influence production 
and process methods (PPMs) outside the jurisdiction of the importing 
country have been anathema to many in the GATT community, and some 
have since expressed alarm that the Appellate Body decision apparently 
allows the use of these process standards. Thailand, for example, 
complained that the decision "will result in an explosive growth in the 
13. 1998 Panel, supra note 10, para. 7.44. 
14. See 1994 Panel, supra note 12, para. 5.26; 1991 Panel, supra note 12, para. 5.27. 
15. Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 121. 
16. See Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 6, at 2145; Carrie Wofford, Note, A Greener Future 
at the WTO: The Refinement of WTO Jurisprudence on Environmental Exceptions to GATT, 24 HARY. 
ENYTL. L. REV. 563, 573 (2000) ("Through a more literal interpretation of the text of Article XX, the 
Appellate Body has abandoned several tests . . .  that prior panels had imposed . .. that had no basis in 
the actual language of Article XX."). 
17. See, e.g., Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 6, at 2172-75; Robert Howse, The Turtles 
Panel: Another Environmental Disaster in Geneva, J. WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1998, at 73. 
18. Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 142. 
• 
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number of environmental ... measures applied to PPMs and justified 
A . l XX "19 pursuant to rtiC e . 
Expressing similar concerns, the 1991 tuna-dolphin panel ruled that 
the MMP A could not come within the Article XX exceptions because it 
sought to protect dolphins from fishing fleets outside the jurisdiction of the 
United States.20 The Appellate Body holding in the shrimp-turtle case 
rejects that particular jurisdictional requirement, so it does not rule against 
the U.S. import ban because it seeks to protect sea turtles from activities 
outside U.S. jurisdiction. The opinion, however, leaves open the question 
of whether there may be some jurisdictional limitation implicit in Article 
XX(g): 
We do not pass upon the question of whether there is an implied 
jurisdictional limitation in Article XX(g), and if so, the nature or extent 
of that limitation. We note only that in the specific circumstances of the 
case before us, there is a sufficient nexus between the migratory and 
endangered marine populations involved and the United States for 
purposes of Article XX(g).
21 
The opinion hints that it might be relevant that sea turtles migrate through 
U.S. territory, and consequently several commentators have suggested that 
such a nexus may be necessary to justify an environmental trade measure 
under Article XX(g).22 
The Appellate Body, however, expressly declined to rule on whether 
such a nexus is actually required, and the reasoning in the opinion militates 
against any such jurisdictional requirement. Such a requirement would be 
inconsistent with the Appellate Body's emphasis on the text of Article XX. 
19. Daniel Pruzin, WTO Formally Adopts Shrimp-Turrle Ruling as Thailand Fears Victory May 
Be Pyrrhic, 15 Int'1 Trade Rep. (BNA) 1884, 1885 (Nov. 11, 1998). 
20. See 1991 Panel, supra note 12, paras. 5.25, .32. 
21. Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 133. 
22. See, e.g., Patricia Isela Hansen, Transparency, Standards of Review, and rhe Use of Trade 
Measures ro Protecr rhe Global Environmenr, 39 VA. J. lNT'L L. 1017, 1057 (1999) ("States may 
permissibly use trade measures to protect resources outside their territorial jurisdiction so long as . . .  
the state has a sufficient 'nexus' with those resources . . . . "); Nancy L. Perkins, Introductory Note to 
Appellate Body, supra note 2, at 119 (suggesting that states may use trade measures to protect 
environmental resources in the global commons "so long as there is at least some jurisdictional 
relationship between those resources and that WfO Member"); Asif H. Qureshi, Extraterritorial 
Shrimps, NGOs and the WTO Appellate Body, 48 lNT 'L & COMP. L.Q. 199, 204 (1999) (reading the 
Appellate Body opinion as "stipulating the need for a nexus between the State and the object of 
environmental concern"); Benjamin Simmons, Note, In Search of Balance: An Analysis of the WTO 
Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 413, 440 ( 1999) ("[l]t remains unclear 
whether future panels will allow countries to implement measures protecting natural resources outside 
their jurisdiction."); Wofford, supra note 16, at 584 (suggesting that "a nation may still need to prove 
that its territory is affected by the environmental concern" to clear "the hurdle of jurisdiction") . 
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In fact, the 1994 tuna-dolphin panel explicitly rejected any limitation on the 
scope of the Article XX exceptions based on the location of the natural 
resources protected by the trade measure in question, because the panel 
found no such limitation in the plain language of Article XX. 23 WTO 
dispute settlement panels should similarly reject any such jurisdictional 
requirement in the future. 
As I have argued elsewhere, restrictions on imports produced by 
environmentally harmful processes can protect important resources wholly 
outside the jurisdiction of the importing country.24 Some countries may 
regulate their own fishing fleets to ensure that they provide optimal 
protection for marine resources, but as long as these regulations raise costs 
for the regulated producers and reduce their output, then these countries 
must also support these regulations with trade measures against imported 
seafood harvested using harmful practices. Otherwise, these imports would 
displace sales of domestic seafood harvested subject to environmental 
regulation. Furthermore, fishing operations may move to unregulated 
countries in order to avoid these environmental regulations. In the extreme, 
if foreign seafood displaces domestic seafood entirely, then countries that 
regulate succeed only in destroying their domestic fishing industry without 
protecting the environment. 
By not only regulating the domestic fishing industry but also shielding 
it against those foreign competitors that use practices that harm the 
environment, countries can ensure that their efforts to change the practices 
of their own producers will not be in vain. Moreover, these trade measures 
protect the environment by inducing foreign fishing fleets to reform their 
practices in order to gain access to regulated markets. Through these 
effects on both domestic and foreign fishing fleets, the application of a 
process standard to imports contributes to the protection of the global 
environment. 
B. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES OF THE EXPORTING COUNTRY 
In the shrimp-turtle case, however, the United States banned shrimp 
imports based on the environmental policies of the exporting country rather 
than the processes used to harvest the particular shipment of shrimp in 
question. Therefore, the panel below ruled against the United States 
because it was "conditioning access to its market ... upon the 
23. See 1994 Panel, supra note 12, paras. 5.15, .20. 
24. See Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 6, at 2177-78. 
2000] ENVIRONMENTAL TRADE MEASURES 37 
adoption .. . of certain policies" by the exporting country's government. 25 
The Appellate Body, however, explicitly and emphatically rejected this 
rationale as an "error in legal interpretation" with "no basis" in the text of 
Article XX.26 The Appellate Body went so far as to declare that banning 
imports based on whether the governments of exporting countries have 
adopted policies "unilaterally prescribed" by the importing country is "a 
common aspect" of Article XX measures.27 The Appellate Body conclu­
ded that to hold that such unilateral import bans cannot fall within Article 
XX would be "abhorrent," because it would render "most, if not all, of the 
specific exceptions of Article XX inutile."28 
Thus, the Appellate Body has indicated that countries may unilaterally 
ban imports based not only on the process used in producing the particular 
units in question but also on the environmental policies of the targeted 
countries. That is, the opinion apparently allows countries to impose a 
unilateral import ban broader than a mere process standard. The opinion 
acknowledges explicitly that while the dispute was before the panel and the 
Appellate Body, the United States excluded even shrimp caught using 
TEDs if the shrimp came from countries not certified by the United States. 
While the Appellate Body expressed some concern about this ban, because 
it applied even to imports that themselves were harvested by 
environmentally friendly processes, it did not state that such a ban was 
necessarily a violation of GATT.Z9 
The 1994 tuna-dolphin panel cited the same feature of the MMPA as 
the reason that it ruled against the United States. The 1994 panel inferred 
that the United States banned tuna imports "so as to force other countries to 
change their policies" and held explicitly that those import bans therefore 
fell outside Article XX.30 The Appellate Body made a similar inference 
regarding the purpose of the U.S. ban on shrimp imports, but did not hold 
25. 1998 Panel, supra note 10, para. 7.45. 
26. Appellate Body, supra note 2, paras. 121-22. 
27. !d. para. 121. 
28. !d. 
29. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text. 
30. 1994 Panel, supra note 12, para. 5.27. Some observers had therefore suggested that the fact 
that section 609 also "pressures harvesting nations to enact specific conservation laws" might "be its 
downfall" before a WTO panel. David E. Kaczka, A Primer 011 the Shrimp-Sea Turtle Controversy, 6 
REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & lNT'L ENYTL. L. 171, 177 (1997). See also Gregory Shaffer, Trade and the 
Environment: Options for Resolving the WTO Shrimp-Turtle Case, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 294, 299 
(Feb. I 8, I 998) (suggesting that the WTO panel might deem the U.S. import ban to be a violation of the 
GATT because the "country-wide scope" of this import ban "constitutes a form of coercion"). 
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that the U.S. measures therefore fell outside Article XX.31 On the contrary, 
the Appellate Body instead declared that "a requirement that a country 
adopt a regulatory program requiring the use of TEDs" is "directly 
connected with the policy of conservation of sea turtles."32 Thus, 
consistent with the plain language of Article XX, the Appellate Body's 
opinion allows for import bans designed to change the policies of other 
governments. In fact, the opinion does not rule out the possibility that even 
trade sanctions imposed with respect to products completely unrelated to 
the marine resource in question may fall within Article XX if they are 
intended to induce other countries to improve their efforts at conservation 
of that resource.33 
Importing countries can promote important environmental objectives 
by requiring exporting countries to improve their conservation efforts as a 
condition for access to domestic market of the importing country.34 When 
process standards alone are not effective in promoting more 
environmentally sound practices or policies, broader import bans are often 
useful in inducing other countries to join multilateral agreements and to 
comply with them.35 Other countries who harm the environment must have 
some reason to come to the negotiating table and to sign an agreement, 
especially given the powerful economic incentives for them to "free ride" 
on the restraint exercised by the countries that do agree to regulate.36 The 
types of trade measures condemned by past panels can create the incentives 
3!. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text; infra note 39 and accompanying text. See 
also Bruce Neuling, The Shrimp-Turtle Case: Implications for Article XX of GAIT and the Trade and 
Environment Debate, 22 LOY. L.A. lNT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 45 (1999) (noting that the Appellate 
Body "implicitly rejected" the reasoning of the 1994 panel). 
32. Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 140. See Susan L. Sakmar, Free Trade and Sea Turtles: 
The Imemational and Domestic Implications of the Shrimp-Turtles Case, 10 COLO. J. lNT'L ENVTL. L. 
& PoL'Y 345, 345 (1999) (concluding that a WTO member may "impose its domestic environmental 
regulations on another member so long as certain safeguards are met"). 
33. For a defense of such trade sanctions, see Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 6, at 2199-
207. 
34. For a comprehensive study of the role of import bans in promoting dolphin conservation, see 
Richard W. Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the Global Commons: What We 
Can Learn From the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO. lNT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1999). 
35. Broader import bans may also discourage environmentally harmful production processes 
more effectively than process standards even without changing the environmental policies of foreign 
governments. See Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 6, at 2178-84. 
36. We can offer "carrots" to countries that regulate, or we can threaten the use of "sticks" 
against those that do not. The prospect of "carrots," however, would create perverse incentives to harm 
the environment. See Chang, International Externalities, supra note 6, at 312-21; Chang, Trade 
Measures, supra note 6, at 2150-60. 
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necessary for countries to join a multilateral agreement that Imposes 
environmental regulations on them.37 
There are, of course, devices other than trade measures that can induce 
the cooperation of foreign governments, and a GATT prohibition on import 
bans would not render the use of other sanctions illegal. Nevertheless, 
many of these other sanctions may sacrifice other important interests or 
have little effect on the governments of particular countries. Because other 
sanctions on behalf of the environment may be costly or ineffective, trade 
restrictions have proven particularly useful instruments in protecting 
environmental interests. 3 8  
C. DISCRIMINATION IN THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 609 
Sensitive to these environmental objectives, the Appellate Body in the 
shrimp-turtle case found the "general design and structure" of section 609 
to be "reasonably related" to a "legitimate policy" of conservation, even if 
it was designed to change the policies of other governments through a 
unilateral import ban.39 The Appellate Body carefully identified problems 
only in the particular way in which the executive branch applied this law to 
shrimp exporting countries.4 0 In particular, the Appellate Body held that 
the implementation of section 609 by the executive branch featured 
"arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries," which 
violated the requirements set forth in the preamble to Article XX.4 1 Thus, 
the Appellate Body avoided the use of any general per se rules against 
environmental trade measures like the sweeping rules announced by panels 
in the past. Instead, the Appellate Body endorsed a case-by-case analysis 
that relies on the requirements explicit in the preamble in Article XX to 
guard against the abuse of the Article XX exceptions,42 much as c1itics of 
past panel decisions, including this author, have proposed.4 3 Given its 
case-specific approach, the opinion is quite explicit regarding precisely 
37. See Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 6, at 2146-60. 
38. See id. at 2149; Chang, Intemational Externalities, supra note 6, at 323-24. 
39. Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 141. 
40. See id. at 159 n.l28. Some commentary fails to make this distinction between the statute and 
the application of the law by the executive branch. See, e.g., Eric L. Richards & Martin A. McCrory, 
The Sea Turtle Dispute: Implications for Sovereignty, the Environment, and International Trade Law, 
7 1  U. CoLO. L. REv. 295, 321 (2000) (stating that the Appellate Body held that "section 609 amounted 
to 'unjustifiable discrimination'"). 
41. GATT art. XX. 
42. See Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 159 (endorsing a balance that "moves as the kind 
and the shape of the measures at stake vary and as the facts making up specific cases differ"). 
43. See, e.g., Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 6, at 2172-75; Steve Chamovitz, The 
Environment vs. Trade Rules: Defogging the Debate, 23 ENYTL. L. 475,513-15 (1993). 
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which particular features of the trade measure in question amount to 
"arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination." Furthermore, each objection 
pertains to a discriminatory aspect of the U.S. policy and is thus tied to the 
actual text of Article XX.44  
First, although section 609 permits some flexibility in determining 
whether an exporting country' s regulatory program is "comparable" to the 
U.S. program, in practice U.S. officials only looked at whether the 
country's policies were "essentially the same" as U.S. policies. 45 Officials 
did not take into account other policies and measures that the country may 
have adopted, nor did they consider different conditions that may exist in 
that other country.46 Because this rigid approach to certification could 
result in a ban on imports from a country with a different yet comparable 
program, the Appellate Body held that this inflexibility amounted to 
"arbitrary discrimination" among countries with comparable programs, m 
violation of the "chapeau" of Article XX. 47 
Second, the United States failed to engage in "serious" negot1at10ns 
with all affected countries before imposing its import ban.48 The United 
States did negotiate with some countries to produce the Inter-American 
Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles, concluded 
in 1996, but not with other countries.49 The result was "unjustifiable" 
discrimination. 5° 
Third, the United States gave fourteen countries a three-year phase-in 
period ( 199 1- 1994).51 The United States did not impose an import ban on 
others until 1996, when it did so with only four months' notice.52 The 
shorter phase-in period was not only more burdensome but also 
44. Although this attention to the text of Article XX represents an improvement over past panel 
decisions, some observers believe that the Appellate Body distorted the meaning of the term 
''discrimination." See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 22, at 4 45 (arguing that the Appellate Body 
·'expanded the term 'discrimination' ... to encompass all of its criticisms of the U.S. measure, 
including criticisms that have no relation to the plain meaning of 'discrimination'"). 
45. Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 163. 
46. See id. para. 164. 
47. Jd. para. 177. For a critique of this reading of the term "discrimination," see Simmons, supra 
note 22, at 443 (arguing that while there is a text-based duty "not to discriminate between countries 
where the conditions are the same, there is no affirmative duty to discriminate where conditions 
between countries are different"). 
48. Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 166. 
49. See id. para. 171. 
50. !d. para. 172. 
5 1. !d. para. 173. 
52. See id. 
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accompanied by less effort by the United States to transfer TED technology 
0 0 53 to the exportmg countnes .  
The Appellate B ody held that these problems i n  the application o f  the 
statute "considered in their cumulative effect" were "unjustifiable 
discrimination" in violation of Article XX. 54 The phrase "in their 
cumulative effect" indicates that one of these defects standing alone would 
not necessarily render the U . S .  policy inconsistent with the GATT. Thus, if 
the United States were to remedy these problems only on a prospective 
basis, these reforms may be sufficient to eliminate the "unjustifiable 
discrimination" in the application of the U.S .  import ban . 55 
Finally, the Appellate B ody complained that the U . S .  certification 
process was not "transparent": there is "no formal opportunity for an 
applicant country to be heard, or to respond to any arguments . . .  made 
against it," "no formal written,  reasoned decision" with reasons for a denial 
of certification, and "[n]o procedure for review of, or appeal from, a 
denial. "56 Thus, the United States denied certification without a process to 
ensure that the statute was "applied in a fair and just manner. "57 The 
Appellate B ody concluded that denials under this procedure amounted to 
"arbitrary discrimination. "58 
D. UNILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL TRADE MEASURES 
The Appellate B ody's critique of the U.S .  implementation of section 
609 has generated some commentary suggesting that "it is generally not 
acceptable for one WTO Member to restrict trade based on the failure of 
other Members to conform their natural resource conservation . . .  policies 
to the unilateral dictates of that WTO Member."59 Eric Richards and 
53. See id. para. 175. 
54. /d. para. 176. 
55. The WTO is unlikely to require anything more than prospective remedies for the second and 
third problems. See Sydney M. Cone, III, The Appellate Body. the Protection of Sea Turtles and the 
Technique of "Completing the Analysis ", J. WORLD TRADE, Apr. 1999, at 5 1, 56 (noting that "the fact 
of discriminatory treatment in the past may be difficult to redress in the present"). Thus, although the 
complainants in the shrimp-turtle case have called upon the United States to lift its ban on shrimp 
imports completely, see supra note 8, a lifting of the import ban is not necessary for the United States to 
comply with the Appellate Body's ruling. 
56. Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 180. For an insightful analysis of the requirement of 
transparency, see Hansen, supra note 22, at 1057-67. 
57. Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 18 1.  
58. !d. para. 184. 
59. Perkins, supra note 22, at 119. Unilateral environmental trade measures have been especially 
controversial. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief Hits Ow Against Unilateral Trade Measures, 15 Int'l 
42 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:31 
Martin McCrory, for example, assert that it is "permissible for a country to 
adopt unilateral measures" only "in rare circumstances.':<Jo They cite the 
Appellate B ody ' s  discussion of the general preference for multilateral 
solutions to international environmental problems over unilateral action s . 61 
The Appellate B ody pointed to the Inter-American Convention as evidence 
that "an alternative course of action" featuring "cooperative efforts" rather 
than "the unilateral and non-consensual procedures of the import 
prohibition" under section 609 "was reasonably open to the United 
S tates."62 
The Appellate B ody's opm10n, however, carefully avoids the 
suggestion that unilateral measures generally fall outside Article XX. S uch 
a claim would be inconsistent with earlier passages i n  the same opinion 
implying that such a rule would render "most, if not all, of the specific 
exceptions of Article XX inutile" and thus would be "abhorrent." 63 S uch a 
claim would also be inconsistent with the use of the singul ar noun in 
Article XX, which permits "any contracting party" to adopt the measures in 
question, and with GATT case law, which has often found unilateral 
measures to fall within Article XX.64 Nothing in the language of Article 
XX suggests that unilateral measures are illegal if they are directed at 
resources outside the jurisdiction of the importing country . 65 
Therefore, when the Appellate Body referred to the alternative of 
"cooperative efforts," 66 it did so only to underscore the feasibility of serious 
negotiations with all affected parties prior to the imposition of trade 
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1058 (June 17, 1998) (reporting WTO chief Renata Ruggiero's criticism of 
unilateral environmental trade measures). 
60. Richards & McCrory, supra note 40, at 340-41. 
61. See id. at 322 (quoting Appellate Body, supra note 2, paras. 168, 171 ) . 
62. Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 171. See Arthur E. Appleton, Shrimp/Turtle: Untangling 
the Nets, 2 J. lNT'L EcoN. L. 477,493 (1999) (concluding that the "need for a co-operative as opposed 
to a unilateral approach is among the central points of the Appellate Body's finding that the US measure 
constituted unjustifiable discrimination"). Thus, Charles Arden-Clarke of the World Wide Fund for 
Nature International complained that the Appellate Body ruling "still prevents countries from taking 
unilateral action on the global commons when irreversible environmental damage takes place." WTO 
Appeals Body Faults Implementation of Shrimp-Turtle Law, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1698, 1699 
(Oct. 14, 1998). 
63. Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 121. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. See 
also Sakmar, supra note 32, at 383 (noting that "the WTO Appellate Body . . .  recognized that unilateral 
measures aimed at protecting the environment could be valid," because "if such measures were not 
valid, the exceptions found in Article XX would be superfluous"); Wofford, supra note 16, at 581 
("[T]he Appellate Body asserted that unilateral environmental policies are not only legitimate, but also 
to be expected under Article XX exceptions."). 
64. GATT art. XX. 
65. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text. 
66. Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 171. 
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measures. That is, the Appellate B ody pointed to the Inter-American 
Convention and this "cooperative" alternative only to criticize the failure of 
the United States "to negotiate similar agreements with any other country 
or group of countries. " 6 7  Thus, a failure to negotiate with all countries on 
an equal basis may render a subsequent trade measure "a means of arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination" against the targeted imports, but a 
unilateral measure would not violate the GATT if even-handed negotiations 
do p recede the imposition of the measure. 
I I .  U . S .  EFFORTS TO COMPLY WITH THE 
SHRIMP-TURTLE RULING 
The Appellate B ody ' s  critique of the U . S .  implementation of section 
609 has also generated controversy regarding what reforms the United 
States must undertake to bring itsel f  into compliance with the GATT. To 
comply with the shrimp-turtle decision, the U . S .  State Department vowed 
to pursue negotiations with the four complainants in the sluimp-turtle case, 
promised to provide technical assistance to them for the development of 
TED programs,  and proposed revisions to its guidelines for the 
implementation of section 609.68 The proposed guidelines would ensure 
consideration of evidence that an exporting country ' s  program for 
protecting sea turtles is comparable to the U . S .  program in light of different 
conditions or the use of methods other than TED requirements, provide 
greater transparency and due process for nations seeking certification under 
section 609, and allow the importation of shrimp harvested by vessels using 
TEDs even if the exporting nation is not certified. 69 The United S tates has 
allowed such shrimp imports since 1998, when the State Department 
adopted this policy after the U.S .  Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
vacated on procedural grounds the decision by the U . S .  Court of 
International Trade prohibiting such irnports?0 The State Department 
67. !d. The Appellate Body does not address the question, "[H]ow much of a diplomatic effort 
must the importing nation make?". Neuling, supra note 31, at 47. If a WTO panel finds that the 
importing nation makes such efforts with all exporting nations on an equal basis, then the panel should 
not engage in further scrutiny of the importing nation's efforts, given the meager basis in the text of 
Article XX for such scrutiny. See Simmons, supra note 22, at 444 ("[T]here is currently no mandate 
within the GATT to engage in bilateral and multilateral negotiations prior to taking unilateral actions."). 
68. See Notice of Proposed Revisions to Guidelines for the Implementation of Section 609 of 
Public Law 101-162 Relating to the Protection of Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 64 
Fed. Reg. 14,481, 14,482 (proposed Mar. 25, 1999). 
69. See id. at 14,481-82, 14,484. 
70. See Earth Island Inst. v. Albright, 147 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1998), vacaring Earth 
Island Inst. v. Christopher, 20 Ct. Int'l Trade 1221 (1996); Revised Notice of Guidelines for 
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issued final guidelines in 1999 that affirmed this "shipment-by-shipment 
exception," allowing shrimp imports if the individual shipment was caught 
with the use of TEDs.7 1  
Environmentalists, however, advocate a "country-by-country" import 
ban, arguing that a "shipment-by-shipment" approach will b e  i neffective in 
protecting sea turtles.72 The U . S .  Court of International Trade ruled in 
favor of environmentalist plaintiffs again in 1999, holding that section 609 
permits the importation of wild shrimp only from certified nations .7 3 
Richards and McCrory have called this holding "a decision that threatens to 
sabotage United States compliance efforts ."7 4 They interpret the shrimp­
turtle ruling to imply that the use of "trade leverage to force similar 
regulations on . . .  trading p artners" would "run afoul of GATT rules."75 
To support this claim, they quote passages in the Appellate Body' s  decision 
stating that the most conspicuous flaw in the "application" of section 609 
"relates to its intended and actual coercive effect on the s pecific policy 
decisions made by foreign governments . "7 6 Sydney Cone also infers that 
Determining Comparability of Foreign Programs for the Protection of Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl 
Fishing Operations, 63 Fed. Reg. 46,094, 46,094-95 (Aug. 28, 1998). 
71. Rossella Brevetti, State Department Issues Guidelines to Comply with WTO Shrimp Ban 
Ruling, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1183, 1183 (July 14, 1999). See Revised Guidelines for the 
Implementation of Section 609 of Public Law 101-162 Relating to the Protection of Sea Turtles in 
Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,946, 36,948 (July 8,  1999). 
72. Rossella Brevetti, USTR to Consult with Interested Parties on How to Respond to Shrimp 
Ruling, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1768, 1768-69 (Oct. 21, 1998). Critics of the shipment-by-shipment 
approach complain that it undermines "the incentive to create a national program" and encourages 
"countries with existing national programs to abandon their all-encompassing programs." Jennifer A. 
Bemazani, Note, The Eagle, the Ttmle, the Shrimp and the WTO: Implications for the Future of 
Environmental Trade Measures, I S  CONN. J. INT' L L. 207, 229 (2000). 
73. See Earth Island Inst. v. Daley, 48 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1081 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1 999). The Court 
of International Trade, however, delayed "entry of j udgment on plaintiff s motion" until the 
"defendants' annual report to Congress" pursuant to section 609, their report to the court on any 
responses to the proposed guideline revisions, and "the presentment of evidence on or before July 2, 
1999" regarding the enforcement of earlier guidelines. !d. See Rossella Brevetti, CIT Faults U.S. 
Implementation of Wild Shrimp Import Ban, 16 Int'l  Trade Rep. (BNA) 638 (Apr. 14, 1999). Citing 
this litigation, Steve Chamovitz has suggested that compliance with the Appellate Body decision would 
require "new legislation." Brevetti, supra note 72, at 1768. See Sakmar, supra note 32, at 387 ("Earth 
Island's  continued challenge to the Guidelines issued by the United States will make it difficult for the 
United States to comply easily with the WTO's ruling."). 
74. Richards & McCrory, supra note 40, at 325. 
75. /d. at 333. See Brooks Ware, Staying Out of the Grasp of the GATT: Attempts to Protect 
Animals at the Expense of Free Trade, CURRENTS, Winter 1998, at 69, 73 ("Section 609 ran afoul of 
Article XX because the U.S. had been excluding shrimp caught with TEDs simply because the country 
where the shrimp were caught had not been 'certified' by section 609."). 
76. Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 161. See Richards & McCrory, supra note 40, at 321. 
As a result of these passages, some observers consider the legality of a country-by-country import ban 
"not so clear." Rosella Brevetti, U.S. Examining Ways to Make Restrictions on Shrimp Imports More 
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the Appellate Body deemed a country-by-country import ban to be a 
violation of the GATT.77 Therefore, Cone criticizes the Appellate Body, 
which "seems to have lost sight of its own statement . . . that there is a 
reasonable relationship between the US rules .. . ' and the legitimate policy 
of conserving an . . .  endangered species. ' "7 8 
If we read the Appellate Body' s  decision as cnticizmg the United 
States for imposing a country-by-country ban, then this criticism would 
indeed be inconsistent with earlier p assages in the same opinion?9 If we 
read the Appellate Body' s  critical statements in context, however, we find 
that the ruling does not object to a country-by-country import b an per se. 
Instead, the Appellate Body objects to the import ban on narrower grounds. 
The Appellate Body ' s  specific complaint is that the United S tates applies 
this import ban to induce other countries to adopt "essentially the same 
comprehensive regulatory regime as that applied by the United States to its 
domestic shrimp trawlers" even though many of these countries "may be 
differently situated." 80 It is this particular aspect of the "coercive effect" 
of the application of section 609 that disturbs the Appellate Body.8 1 
Therefore, the United States can apply a country-by-country import 
ban as long as it allows an exporting country to argue that it is "differently 
situated" so that its program for the protection of sea turtles may be 
Transparent, 1 6  Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 309, 3 1 0  (Feb. 24 , 1 999) (quoting one anonymous source as 
stating that the Appellate Body' s  decision "is kind of grey" on this issue) .  
77. See Cone, supra note 55,  at 53,  55, 5 8. According to Cone, "the Appellate Body' s  
rationale . . .  seems to be . . .  that the measures taken by the United States were not in confonnity with 
the chapeau because they were unilateral measures undermining the multilateral trading system." /d. at 
57. 
78. !d. (quoting Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 1 4 1 ). Cone complains that "the Appellate 
Body ignored the difficult question of whether vessel-specific (as opposed to country-by-country) 
enforcement of the US regulations would be too limited" to protect sea turtles. !d. at 5 8. See Neuling, 
supra note 3 1 ,  at 47 (complaining that "the suggestion that the U.S. Government should not exclude 
shrimp caught with TEDs" will limit "the ability of the U.S. Government to influence environmental 
practices abroad" and that "any system relying on shipment-by-shipment inspections . . .  would be 
vulnerable to fraud"). 
79. See supra notes 26-39 and accompanying text. 
80. Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 1 65 (noting that "shrimp caught using methods identical 
to those employed in the United Stares have been excluded from the United States market solely 
because they have been caught in waters of countries that have not been certified by the United Scates " 
and concluding from this fact that "this measure, in its application, is more concerned with effectively 
influencing WTO Members to adopt essentially the same comprehensive regulatory regime as that 
applied by the United States"). See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text. 
81 .  See Appellate Body, supra note 2, para. 1 6 1  (criticizing the embargo for requiring other 
countries "to adopt essentially the same policy . . .  as that applied to . . .  United States domestic shrimp 
trawlers") .  
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certified as "comparable" to that of the United States.82 Thus,  the United 
States would be in compliance with the Appellate Body ' s  ruling even if it 
were to return to a country-by-country i mport ban, because it has already 
revised its guidelines to allow for this more flexible approach to 
certification . This reform, together with reforms that ensure greater 
transparency in the certification process, equal access to technical 
assistance, and even-handed negotiations with exporting countries, IS 
sufficient to bring the United S tates into compliance with the GATT. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellate B ody ' s  ruling in the shrimp-turtle case i ndicates that 
imp011ing countries can defend environmental trade measures-even 
unilateral import b ans-under GATT Article XX as long as they avoid 
unfair discrimination. These unilateral trade measures may j ustifiably 
discriminate against imports produced by processes that h arm n atural 
resources located outside the j urisdiction of the importing countries or 
against imports from countries that have environmental policies deemed 
inadequate by the importing country. An exporting country can challenge 
such measures, however, if they are applied in a manner that amounts to 
"arbitrary or unj ustifiable discrimination between countries" or "a 
disguised restriction on international trade."83 In particular, the Appellate 
B ody ' s  ruling holds that to avoid "arbitrary or u nj ustifiable 
discrimination," the country imposing a b an on imports from an exporting 
country must provide a formal hearing that allows the exporting country to 
argue that it has comparable environmental policies even if they are not 
precisely the same as the policies in the importing country, open serious 
negotiations with all exporting countries on a equal basis, make the same 
efforts to transfer technology to all exporting countries, and provide a 
formal notice of the reasons for adverse decisions and some procedure for 
review of or appeal from these denials. B y  basing its scrutiny of 
82. See Joseph Robert Berger, Note, Unilateral Trade Measures to Conserve the World 's Living 
Resources: An Environmental Breakthrough for the GATT in the WTO Sea Turtle Case, 24 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 355, 376 (1999) (noting that "[t]he WTO focused on the combination of the nationwide 
approach with the imposition of an inflexible. comprehensive regulatory program on all targeted 
nations" and suggesting that "[ i ]f  the United States can address the latter problem," then "the 
nationwide embargo approach might be accepted") (emphasis added). Peter Fugazzotto of the Earth 
Island Institute has expressed the view that the shipment-by-shipment approach is not necessary for 
compliance with the Appellate Body rul ing, but he concedes that "[ w )hether the A s i an nations agree 
with that remains to be seen." Brevetti, supra note 76, at 3 1 0. 
83. GATT art. XX .  I have argued elsewhere that these provisos, properly interpreted and 
vigorously enforced, are sufficient to guard against the abuse of environmental trade measures for 
protectionist purposes. See Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 6, at 2 1 9�99. 
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environmental trade measures only on requirements that me expl icit in the 
text of Article XX of the GATT, the Appellate B ody strikes a more 
reasonable balance between environmental and trade interests than panels  
in prior decisions have struck. The case-by-case approach endorsed by the 
Appellate Body should provide much broader leeway for the use of 
environmental trade measures than suggested by past panel decisions.  
